“In my opinion we don’t have any other choice. Every Armenian knows that if we fail to defend this little sacred land, we’ll no longer exist.”
- Colonel Armen Vardanyan Director of Air Defense Forces of the Republic of Armenia.
The quote is taken from a recent documentary called “My army. Our Piece of the Sky.”
As the Four Day War in April has shown, the conventional warfare in Artsakh’s battlefield has dramatically changed since the 1990s. The early stages of battle are no longer about using large infantries supported by armored columns marching across the battlefield but extensive use of heavy artillery systems such as “Smerch” and ‘kamikaze’ drones tens of miles away from trenches. Furthermore, the Azerbaijani military is not the same as it was before. Its military capabilities have vastly increased for the past twenty two years as well as the effectiveness of their tactical operations has greatly improved.
As the Four Day War has shown, the amount of Azerbaijani firepower has increased to the point of being able to break Armenian defenses in certain areas along the frontline. Underestimating Azerbaijan’s military capabilities and overestimating Armenia’s own military capabilities may have been the main reason for the unexpected consequences of the Four Day War. Ineffective command-control system was perhaps another reason.
The Armenian response to the Azerbaijani onslaught revealed a number of shortcomings discussed previously. Taking absolutely defensive posture along the line of contact and using ineffective rules of engagement were some of them. As a result the Armenian side incurred significant casualties during the first forty eight hours of the Azerbaijani Blitzkrieg. The amount of firepower unleashed upon the Armenian troops defending their frontline was enormous.
Despite heroic resistance by Armenian frontline troops, territorial losses became a reality. Granted, a lot has changed since then, but few things are yet to be fixed. Developing asymmetric warfare and hybrid warfare capabilities are some of them. Despite effective PR campaign ran by the Armenian MOD during The Four Day War, lack of psychological operations or hesitation to carry them out swiftly and effectively to stop Azerbaijani aggression was apparent. The Armenian military appeared to be using twentieth century tactics against means of twenty first century conventional warfare unleashed against them.
To fix those shortcomings, Armenian forces need to develop such devastating conventional warfare capabilities that will be tantamount to a near-nuclear deterrence. Developing effective conventional strike systems capable of destroying the enemy in a very short period of time before even launching the first rocket-artillery strikes against its positions is one of them. For example, launching a development of domestically produced supersonic gliders capable of carrying multiple warheads at breakneck speeds may allow Armenian forces to acquire near-nuclear capabilities. Strikes against Azerbaijani military installations by supersonic gliders will release enough energy to equal the power of small tactical nuclear warheads.
Furthermore, Armenian forces need to invest heavily in their asymmetric warfare capabilities such as cyber warfare. A major cyberattack against Azerbaijani electric grid and other infrastructures of strategic importance can breakdown Azerbaijani command-control systems wreaking havoc upon their troops in the battlefield. Additionally, elements of hybrid warfare need to be considered and studied further.
Armenia’s defensive posture needs to be offensive in nature. Adopting proactive defense measures such as carrying out surgical preemptive strikes against large concentration of Azerbaijani troops and military equipment along the frontline will be needed to prevent another repeat of Azerbaijani Blitzkrieg. Anything different may undermine its security and question the resilience of the Armenian statehood.